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Greater	Manchester	Tier	3	rules:	what	the	stand-off
tells	us	about	England’s	centralisation
While	the	performative	stand-off	between	the	government	and	Greater	Manchester	mayor	Andy
Burnham	has	provoked	a	new	debate	about	England’s	centralisation,	every	aspect	of	the	crisis	has
been	seen	before,	writes	John	Denham.
With	the	Manchester	lockdown	having	been	announced	without	an	‘agreement’	with	mayor	Andy
Burnham,	and	with	First	Minister	Mark	Drakeford	having	confirmed	a	‘fire-break’	lockdown	in	Wales,
the	contrasting	powers	of	the	devolved	nations,	England’s	localities,	and	the	union	government	could
not	have	been	made	more	obvious.	Every	English	lockdown	measure	is	imposed	by	the	union	government.	Local
leaders	have	no	legal	powers	to	veto	or	amend	proposals.	Any	ability	to	extract	extra	cash	reflects	the
government’s	desire	to	see	them	share	responsibility	or	blame,	not	a	rational	assessment	of	need.
The	performative	stand-off	has	provoked	a	new	debate	about	England’s	centralisation	under	the	union	government;
yet	every	aspect	of	the	current	crisis	has	been	seen	many	times	before.	For	decades,	England’s	governance	has
been	defined	by	management	of	the	relationship	between	the	centre	and	the	local,	the	distribution	of	funding	within
England,	the	structures	by	which	local	areas	are	represented,	the	autonomous	powers	that	they	hold	(or	lack),	and
the	inability	of	the	union’s	political	culture	to	reflect	the	reality	of	multiple	centres	of	power.
Local	leaders	resisting	the	proposed	lockdown	on	Manchester	didn’t	want	to	accept	a	pre-determined	set	of	actions
decided	in	Whitehall,	and	certainly	not	without	adequate	funding.	That	Whitehall-defined	relationship	has	dominated
the	thirty-year	history	of	English	devolution.	Whether	through	nominated	regional	assemblies,	government	offices,
or	city	regions	and	combined	authorities,	union	policy	under	all	three	parties	has	been	‘elite	co-option’:	finding	ways
of	engaging	local	stakeholders,	including	councils	and	business	leaders,	in	delivering	Westminster	priorities.	It	has
allowed	little	autonomy	in	setting	different	priorities	to	the	centre	and	little	significant	control	over	resources.
Just	as	the	union	government	has	been	slow	to	allow	local	public	health	to	take	the	lead	on	test,	track	and	trace,	so
it	has	long	refused	the	powers	needed	to	reshape	local	economies.	Capital	investment	is	tightly	held	by	union
ministers	and	regional	transport	never	gets	the	consistent	political	and	financial	support	given	to	HS1,	HS2	and
Cross-Rail.	Metro-leaders	have	had	little	choice	but	to	pursue	city	centre-focussed	regeneration	based	in	property
and	higher	education,	often	to	the	detriment	of	surrounding	towns.
Under	the	union,	England	is	the	most	centralised	nation	in	Europe	(measured	by	the	proportion	of	funds	raised	and
dispersed	locally).	While	the	Barnett	formula	provides	some	relative	protection	to	Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern
Ireland,	there	is	no	mechanism	to	ensure	that	England’s	localities	receive	fair,	needs-based	funding.	The	union
government	has	imposed	the	harshest	austerity	on	England’s	poorest	areas,	now	including	many	with	the	highest
Covid-19	infections	and	worst	health	status.
Conservative	ministers	representing	constituencies	with	high	infection	rates	are	claimed	to	have	avoided	local
lockdowns	imposed	in	areas	with	lower	infection	rates.	The	varied	outcomes	of	tier	three	negotiations	appear	to
reflect	whether	the	Conservatives	have	a	strong	electoral	interests	and	loud	local	voices	in	the	areas.	Ministers
were	accused	of		intervening	to	divert	regeneration	funding	towards	Conservative	marginal	seats	ahead	of	those
with	greater	need.	But	union	governments	have	always	had	a	more	or	less	unrestrained	ability	to	act	arbitrarily
towards	England’s	localities.
Not	only	is	the	pandemic	hitting	the	most	deprived	regions	of	England	hardest	–	partly	because	of	a	London-centric
decision	to	raise	the	lockdown	when	much	of	the	North	was	still	in	wave	one	–	but	Conservative	gains	in	‘Red	Wall’
seats	give	both	major	parties	a	strong	interest	in	‘speaking’	for	the	north.	It	is	likely	that	a	pan-northern	identity	and
politics	will	grow.	But	the	‘north-south’	characterisation	of	England	is	much	harder	to	sustain.	More	of	England	is
outside	the	‘north’	and	‘greater	London’	than	inside	either	and	this	England	needs	better	government	too.	The
‘politics	of	the	north’	can	simply	become	special	pleading	for	a	better	deal	from	the	union	government	that	implicitly
accepts	that	real	power	will	remain	in	London.	To	date,	‘levelling	up’	is	a	Whitehall-led	process,	handing	out	dribs
and	drabs	in	finance	to	favoured	projects	in	favourite	constituencies.	Nothing	about	it	will	change	the	pattern	of	de-
industrialisation,	financialisation	and	globalisation	that	has	so	tilted	the	economy	towards	the	south-east.
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It	was	significant	that	resistance	was	described	by	Health	Secretary	Matt	Hancock	as	‘party	politics’	even	though
Burnham	was	supported	by	Conservative	MPs	and	council	leaders.		Despite	twenty	years	of	devolved
administrations	and	rhetoric	about	English	devolution,	union	politics	still	lacks	the	mature	political	culture	that	can
accept	someone	of	a	different	political	party	as	the	legitimate	elected	representative	of	their	nation	or	locality.	This
cloth-eared	insensitivity	to	the	needs	of	a	multi-centred	democracy	is	the	biggest	single	threat	to	the	union
All	these	problems	stem,	at	root,	from	the	embedded	culture	of	British	nationalist	unionism.	It	has	obstructed
change	in	the	past,	and	is	what		makes	change	now	challenging.	For	London-centric	think-tanks	and	those	deeply
immersed	in	Whitehall’s	ways	favour	a	revived	regional	agenda	that,	for	all	their	real	ambition,	are	likely	to	be	no
more	successful	than	in	the	past.	The	English	public	remain	deeply	sceptical	about	regional	assemblies,	which
always	get	far	less	support	than	any	of	the	status	quo,	English	Laws	made	only	by	English	MPs,	or	an	English
Parliament.
The	same	public	strongly	prefer	England	being	treated	as	one	unit	to	regionalisation.	This	is	quite	compatible	with
seeing	one’s	own	area	as	unfairly	treated.	So,	while	there	is	some	support	for	further	devolution	to	combined
authorities,	it	suggests	more	explicit	devolution	of	powers	will	have	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	a	commitment	to
transparent	and	fair	funding	across	England.	This	real	levelling	up	would	be	far	easier	in	a	booming	economy	with
large	tax	surpluses	–	an	unlikely	scenario	in	the	foreseeable	future	–	and	would	require	a	union	wide	approach	that
would	likely	signal	the	end	of	the	Barnett	formula.
All	would	require	a	profound	change	in	the	way	England	itself	is	governed.	Labour	did	not	pursue	real	English
devolution.	The	current	government,	the	most	aggressively	British	nationalist	for	decades,	is	attempting	to		overturn
key	elements	of	devolution	through	the	Internal	Market	Bill.	It	is	unlikely	to	let	go	of	any	central	power	over	England.
England	remains	the	only	part	of	the	union	to	have	had	no	consultation,	let	alone	referendum,	on	how	it	is	governed
in	the	past	twenty	years.
____________________
Note:	For	further	reading	see	relevant	chapters	here.
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